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NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants were charged by information, filed on 5 June
1980, for violating provisions of Section 76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii),
U.C.A.

(1953), to wit:

engaging in a sexual act involving the

genitals of one person and the mouth of another, without the
consent of the victim, DENNIS FRAZIER, compelling submission to
the said sexual act by the threat of death or serious bodily
injury to be inflicted imminently on the said DENNIS FRAZIER.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

-

-- --- ---

Appellants were found not guilty of violating Section
76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), but were found guilty of violating Section
76-5-403(2), forcible sodomy, a lessor included offense.

Both

Appellants were subsequently committed to the Utah State Prison
to serve terms of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully seek reversal of the lower Court's
judgment or, alternatively, an order remanding the case for a new
trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

----

Appellants' case was submitted to the jury with the Court's
instructions and three sets of acceptable verdict.

Those

- 1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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instructions and verdicts allowed that the jury might find
Appellants either guilty of aggravated sexual assault, guilty of
forcible sodomy, or not guilty (see pages 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,
and 57 of the Record on Appeal) .

ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

Appellants were entitled to have the jury instructed
relative to all lessor included offenses not
necessarily precluded by the evidence.

Amendment number XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the
United States provides, inter alia, that no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."

Likewise the Constitution of Utah in

Article I, Section 2 declares that governmental powers are "for
(the people's) equal protection" and in Article I, Section 7 that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."

Section 76-1-402(4) U.C.A.

(1953),

directs that "the Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury
with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense."
Appellants assert that there existed such a rational basis
to believe they were not guilty of the offense charged but guilty
of certain lessor included offenses that were not offered to the
jury; that the Court was obligated to instruct the jury with

- 2 -
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respect to those included offenses; that they were, therefore,
denied equal protection and due process of the law in that their
convictions were entered in violation of Section 76-1-402(4).
The Court has many times passed on a defendant's right to
have lessor included offenses offered to the jury:
One of the fundamental principles in regard to the
submission of issues to the juries is that where the parties
so request, they are entitled to have instructions given
upon their theory of the case; and this includes on lessor
offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence would
support such a verdict. This is in accord with the
authorities generally and with the adjudications of this
Court, as stated in a number of cases dealing with
instructing on lessor offenses. State v. Gillian, 463 P2d
8ll (1970). See State v. Castillo, 457 P2d 618; State v.
Hyams, 230 P 349 (1924); State v. Thompson, 170 P2d 153
(1946); Stevenson v. United States, 16 S.Ct. 839; State v.
Johnson, 185 P2d 738 (1947).
We have held that each party is entitled to have his theory
of the case which is supported by competent evidence
submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions; and the
failure to present for the jury's consideration a party's
theory by appropriate instructions is reversible error.
State v. Newton, 144 P2d 290 (1943).
If in a case of different degrees of charged greater
offense, there is sufficient evidence to submit the case to
the jury of the charged greater offense, I do not see
wherein it is the perogative of the Court to direct the jury
of what degree only the jury may find the defendant guilty,
or to direct them that, if they do not find him guilty of
the charged greater offense they must acquit him.
To permit
the Court to do that is to permit it to be the judge of the
facts.
State v. Fergfuson, 279 P.55 (1929).
The well established general rule, that the jury should be
instructed on lessor included offenses when such a
conviction would be warranted by any reasonable view of the
evidence, is in accord with and supported by our statutory
law. State v. Close, 499 P2d 287 (1972).
Each party is, however, entitled to have the jury instructed
on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is
any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. State
v. Torres, 619 P2d 694 (1980).
- 3 -
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. . . . if there be any evidence, however slight, on any
reasonable theory of the case under which the Defendant
might be convicted of a lessor included offense, the Court
must, if requested, give an appropriate instruction. State
v. Dougherty, 550 P2d 175 (1976).
~~Instructions on the lessor offense may be given because all
elements of the lessor offense have been proven. Such an
instruction may properly be refused if the prosecution has
met its burden of proof on the greater offense, and there is
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense.
If there
be any evdience, however slight, on any reasonable theory of
the case under which Defendant might be convicted of-a
lessor included offense, the trial Court must, if requested,
give an appropriate instruction.
(Emphasis added by the
Court). State v. Chesnut, 621 P2d 1228 (1980).
Other states take identical positions regarding instructing
relative to lessor included offenses.

See, for example, Bowers

v. People, 617 P2d 560 (1980) at 562, and People v. Glenn, 615
P2d 700 (1980) at 705, both Colorado cases; and State v.
Jimerson, 618 P2d 1027 (1980) at 1029, a Washington state case.
The law seems to be, then, that if any evidence is presented
that would cause reasonable jurors to convict on a lessor offense
and acquit on the greater, the jury must be instructed relative
to those lessor included offenses.

Appellants claim such

evidence was introduced so that instructions on lessor included
offenses were required.

This brief will argue for the existence

of such evidence in Point III, below.

POINT II:

This Court may review the trial Court's refusal to
instruct on all lessor included offenses whether or
not trial counsel objected thereto.

At the trial of this matter, Defendant ELLIOTT was
represented by Mr. CASEY CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.; Defendant CLAYTON was
- 4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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represented by Mr. STEPHEN R. MADSEN, ESQ.

(see pages 34, 35, 36,

37, 38, and 39 of the Record on Appeal); Defendant ELLIOTT
apparently did not file a written request.

Part of Defendant

CLAYTON'S request was an instruction on the lessor included
offense of assault by a prisoner (see page 37 of the Record on
Appeal) .
The Minute Entry designated as "Trial" indicates that on the
second day of the trial, prior to reading the instructions to the
jury, the Court met with counsel in chambers relative to jury
instructions (see page 60 of the Record on Appeal).

The

transcript of the trial, at Page 237, line 1, indicates that
Defendant ELLIOTT, through his counsel, objected to the Court's
refusal to instruct on the lessor included offenses of assault
and aggravated assault.
Appellants claim there is authority for this Court to
exercise its discretion and assign error to the trial Court's
instructions if they omitted charges relative to additional
lessor included offenses for which evidence would support
convictions.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, No. 51, Instructions

to Jury: Objections, prescribes, "No party may assign as error
the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto.

In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a

party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds to his objections.

Notwithstanding the foregoing

requirement, the appellate Court, in its discretion and in the
interest of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an

- 5 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instruction.

Similarly the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, Rule

19-Instructions, states in paragraph (c)

"No party may assign as

error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be
assigned to instructions in order to avoid manifest injustice."
Case law also supports such assignment of error by a reviewing
Court, absent counsel's failure to request instructions at time
of trial:
in capital cases and in cases of grave and serious
charged offenses and convictions of long terms of
imprisonment, cases involving the life and liberty of the
citizen, we think that when palpable error is made to appear
on the face of the record and to the manifest prejudice of
the accused, the Court has the power to notice such error
and to correct the same, though no formal exception was
taken to the ruling. August v. U.S., 257 F. 388 (1918).
Speaking of this rule that no review will be had of instructions
or refusals to instruct where no exception was taken, this Court
has reached the same conclusion as did the above Federal Court
ruling:
Such rule, however, is not uniform as to all errors so
committed.
In many jurisdictions there are well recognized
exceptions to the general rule, especially in criminal cases
involving capital offenses or other grave and serious
offenses of long term imprisonment, and sometimes has even
been applied in civil cases, when palpable error on the face
of the record involved violations of fundamental rights and
privileges of manifest prejudice to the party aggrieved.
State v. Cobo, 60 P2d 592 (1936).
The reason the rule is sometimes relaxed to allow appellate
review where no objection or exceptions were taken at the trial
level is because instructions on lessor included offenses are
fundamental to the Defendant's case.
-

Because those instructions

6 -
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are vital to the Defendant, the trial Court should alert the jury
if even on its own motion:
This Court in a number of decisions has affirmed the rule
above stated requiring the submission of lessor included
offenses when the evidence and circumstances so justify, and
has gone further in indicating that even in the absence of
an appropriate objection, if it is clear that the interests
of justice so require, that the Court should instruct on
included offenses. State v. Close, supra.
The Kansas Supreme Court spoke similarly of instructions on
lessor included offenses saying:
Such an instruction is required even though such
instructions have not been requested or have been objected
to. State v. Mark's, 602 P2d 1344 (1979).
The Arizona appellate Court ruled:
Where the matter is vital to the rights of a defendant,
however, the trial judge is required to instruct on its own
motion, even if the Defendant fails to request him to do so.
State v. Baker, 617 P2d 39 (1980).
Appellants assert their case meets all criteria for this
Court to exercise its discretion to review the trial Court's
omission of certain lessor included offenses in its instructions
to the jury:

1) Rules 51 and 19(c) vest this Court with such

authority, 2) case law indicates such instructions are
fundamental and vital to Appellants' rights to due process, 3)
Appellants were charged with violating a felony of the first
degree--a grave and serious offense, 4) Appellants were convicted
of a felony of the second degree--a conviction of long term
imprisonment, 5) the Trial Court did not act on its own to
adequately instruct the jury, 6)

the evidence supports

convictions on various lessor included offenses, as will be shown
in Point III, below.

- 7 -
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POINT III:

Appellants were entitled to have the jury instructed
that a verdict could have been returned on any of the
following lessor included offenses:
--Section 76-5-103.5, U.C.A.

(1953), aggravated

assault by a prisoner, a 2nd degree felonyi
--Section 76-5-403 (2), U.C.A.

(1953), forcible

sodomy, a 2nd degree felonyi
--Section 76-4-101, U.C.A.

(1953), attempted forcible

sodomy, a 3rd degree felonyi
--Section 76-5-404(1), U.C.A.

(1953), forcible sexual

abuse, a 3rd degree felonyi
--Section 76-5-102.5, U.C.A.

(1953), assault by a

prisoner, a 3rd degree felony.
As shown in Point I, instructions on lessor included
offenses must be given if any evidence is produced at trial which
would support a conviction on such included offensei such
instructions may be omitted only if

~

evidence is produced to

support a conviction on the included offense.
It is conceded that the evidence produced at the trial of
this matter is consistent insofar as it establishes that both
Defendants were inmates of the Utah County Jail on 4 May 1980,
the date of the incident for which they were tried.

The evidence

also consistently establishes that on that date both Defendants
made unlawful physical contact with their victim, repeatedly,
without his consent, and against his efforts.

But much of the

rest of the evidence is conflicting.

- 8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Some of the evidence indicated that the Defendants "used a
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury"
or threatened their victim with "death or serious bodily injury
to be inflicted imminently."

See witness DENNIS FRAZIER'S

testimony at:
page
page
page
page
page

28,
43,
47,
70,
73,

line
line
line
line
line

23 to page 29, line 12;
1 to page 43, line 12;
20 to page 48, line 6;
14 to page 72, line 8;
9 to page 73, line 27;

See also witness CARL HOWE'S testimony at:
page 144, line 19 to page 144, line 29.
But other evidence did not substantiate the contention that
Defendants used or threatened death or serious bodily injury.
See WILLIAM CLAYTON'S testimony at:
page 161, line 21 to page 161, line 28;
page 164, line 21 to page 164, line 29.
See LARRY ELLIOTT'S testimony at:
page
page
page
page

177,
181,
185,
186,

line
line
line
line

4 to page 177, line 10;
6 to page 181, line 18;
1 to page 186, line 10;
14 to page 187, line 12;

Some of the testimony seemed to establish that on one or
more occasions one or both of the Defendants touched genitals to
the mouth of DENNIS FRAZIER.
page
page
page
page

32,
34,
37,
45,

line
line
line
line

See DENNIS FRAZIER'S testimony at:

10 to page 32, line 23;
9 to page 34, line 16;
24 to page 38, line 13;
24 to page 46, line 4.

BRAD PERRY testified similarly:
page 111, line 9 to page 111, line 11;
page 118, lines 24 to 29.
However, other witnesses testified that, while the
Defendants displayed their genitals, there was not the contact
-

9 -
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between them and the victim's mouth necessary to constitute the
offense of sodomy.

See MICHAEL TAYLOR'S testimony at:

page 98, line 30 to page 99, line 12;
page 100, lines 5 through 8.
See CARL HOWE'S testimony at:
page
page
page
page
page

146,line 7 to page 146, line 13;
146, line 18 to page 146, line 21;
147, line 4 to page 147, line 9;
150, line 1 to page 150, line 13;
151, line 1 to page 151, line 15.

See WILLIAM CLAYTON'S testimony at:
page 158, lines 18 through 22;
page 159, lines 17 through 22;
page 172, line 29 to page 173, line 7.
See LARRY ELLIOTT'S testimony at:
page 176, line 25 to page 177, line 3;
page 177, lines 11 through 15;
page 184, lines 7 through 18.
Given the foregoing conflicting testimony, the jury could
have rationally found either for or against the existence of
threats of imminent death or serious bodily injury.

In fact, the

jury did return a verdict that found such a threat did not
exist.

Likewise, the jury could have concluded rationally either

way on the issue of whether or not there was a touching of the
Defendants' genitals with the victim's mouth.

However, the

instructions and verdict blanks given to the jury at the trial
removed from them the option of returning a verdict that
reflected a finding that there were no such touchings or
threats.

And denying the jury that option does not comply with

the weight of the authority of case law which prescribes that
instructions on lessor included offenses must be given if there
exists

~

evidence to support a conviction on the included
- 10 -
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offense.
Applying these rational and possible findings of facts, the
jury could have returned verdicts convicting one or both
Defendants of any of the following lessor included offenses which
they were not instructed to consider at the time of trial:
1.

Aggravated assault by a prisoner a)

to do bodily injury, b)

threats or attempts

use or threats of deadly force, c)

Defendants were prisoners by statutory definition, d) but no
sodomistic touching;
2.

Assault by a prisoner a) threats or attempts to do

bodily injury, b) Defendants were prisoners by definition, c) but
no use or threats of deadly force, and d) no sodomistic touching;
3.

Attempted forcible sodomy a) attempts at, but no

fruition of sodomistic touching, b) attempts made without the
victim's consent;
4.

Forcible sexual abuse a) no sodomistic touching nor

attempts at sodomistic touching, b) but the taking of indecent
liberties with the victim and an intent to cause substantial
emotional or bodily pain to the victim, without the consent of
the victim.

CONCLUSIONS
Case law from the Federal system, from this Court, and from
other state Supreme Courts holds that a criminal defendant is
entitled to have his jury instructed relevant to all lessor
included offenses if there is any evidence to support a
conviction on such lessor offense.

The trial Court may omit such

- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instructions only if there is no evidence to support a conviction
on an included offense.

Defendants' entitlement to such

instructions is fundamental to the preservation of their rights
to due process.
Because this right is so vital to the Defendants, the trial
Court is obliged to see to it that the jury is instructed on the
availability of convictions for lessor included offenses, if even
on its own motion, notwithstanding Defendants' failure to request
those instructions, and in spite of the opposition's objection to
such instructions.

Further, statutory and case law permit

appellate review of the trial Court's omissions of such
instructions even though Defendants did not adequately record
objections thereto, because the right abridged is vital to
Defendants, the penalties and loss of liberty are potentially
severe, and the evidence supported instructions, on all lessor
included offenses.
Testimonial evidence introduced at the trial of Defendants
establishes that there was much evidence that would have
supported convictions on several lessor included offenses that
were not offered to the jury.

As a result, the jury was allowed

to consider only one included offense--a 2nd degree felony--and
was not allowed to consider four other included offenses--one 2nd
degree felony and three 3rd degree felonies.
It is likely that the jury--while convinced that "a" crime
had been committed--returned guilty verdicts for forcible sodomy
charges only because they had no other lessor included offenses

- 12 -
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to choose from.

Defendants were, therefore, denied due process

of law and equal protection of the laws in violation of the
Constitutions of both the United State and of Utah as well as
Section 76-1-402 (4), U.C.A.

(1953).

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

d~te

below he

mailed a copy of the above Appellants' Brief to DAVID L.
WILKINSON, Attorney General, State of Utah, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, with all postal and other
fees prepaid.
DATED this

,'~I

day of March, 1981.
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